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As with few other contributions to the literature on Michel Foucault, David Webb’s book1 is 
refreshingly easy to describe: it is a chapter-by-chapter commentary on Foucault’s Archaeol-
ogy of Knowledge, flanked by an opening “Background” and some very brief “Closing Re-
marks,” which serve to situate and defend the author’s Ansatzpunkt, or toehold, within a 
certain subfield of the philosophy of science, to wit the epistemology and history of mathe-
matics. Within this still rather vast intellectual domain, Webb operates a further delimita-
tion, and selects the epistemo-historical reflections of Jean Cavaillès, Gaston Bachelard, and 
Michel Serres, as his minimum heuristic set of philosophical “precedents” (1) for Foucault’s 
methodological innovations in The Archaeology of Knowledge.  
 While the description of the book is simple, the task that Webb sets himself in 
it is anything but. In brief, he sets out to correct (non-polemically) the still widely popular 
narrative (no doubt encouraged by some of Foucault’s own pronouncements) according to 
which the French philosopher ‘turned’ away from archaeology to genealogy on account of 
the former’s presumed ‘failure.’ In this scenario, no sooner had Foucault finished The Ar-
chaeology of Knowledge2 than he was finished with it (as both book and method). In contrast, 
Webb seeks to make the case that, far from being a failure, archaeology as a method in fact 
accomplishes a great deal, and that the book by the same title allows us to identify and take 
stock of precisely these accomplishments, which Foucault could then safely mobilize and 
rework in his later writings. 
On my conservative count, there are three major and interrelated achievements of 
the Archaeology according to Webb. The first one is that it furthers a problematic or program 
that Foucault had been invested in since his secondary doctoral thesis,3 but most explicitly 
in The Order of Things, namely the continuation of ‘critique’ by other means. As Webb rightly 
insists, it is not enough to describe these other means as historical: one has to understand 
                                                 
1 There are 181 pages in this hardcover edition (not 256, as advertised by various online retailers). 
2 Published in 1969 at Gallimard, it is Foucault’s most sustained treatment of the eponymous method.  
3 Which consisted of Foucault’s translation – with a copious Introduction – of Kant’s Anthropology from a 
Pragmatic Point of View. The full text of the Introduction was only published in 2008 by Vrin, followed by 
its English translation the same year: Michel Foucault, Introduction to Kant’s Anthropology, translated by 
Roberto Nigro and Kate Briggs (Los Angeles: Semiotext[e], 2008).  
Foucault Studies, No. 19, pp. 234-240. 
 
 235 
history here in a precise sense, namely as “freed from the anthropological theme,”4 i.e. from 
man as the “strange empirico-transcendental doublet”5 (object and subject, or conditioned 
and condition of knowledge) bequeathed to us by Kantian philosophy. Foucault’s task in 
the Archaeology, therefore, is to show “how a condition can be a non-causal condition of ex-
perience, without standing above or apart from the experience it conditions” (33) – that is, 
without being empirical or transcendental. 
If this is the problem to which Foucault responds (and so far Webb does not diverge 
from the standard interpretation of the Archaeology), then the book “can […] be read,” as 
Webb himself does, “not just as a retrospective exercise in methodology covering his earlier 
works, but as an experiment in a form of thought that he saw taking shape in the wake of 
the disappearance of man” (7). Taking his cue from a remark in Foucault’s Order of Things6 
that is rarely discussed in the literature, Webb sets out to identify ‘precedents’ for this thor-
oughly historical (non-anthropological) form of thought in the philosophy of mathematics 
of the first half of the twentieth century, specifically in the writings of Jean Cavaillès and 
Gaston Bachelard, but also in Michel Serres’ early work on the history and epistemology of 
mathematics, as well as his readings of Lucretius and Leibniz (7). What they all have in 
common is an effort to relax the “fundamental requirement for unity that characterised 
Kantian transcendental conditions” (14) by removing the putative source of such unity, i.e. 
the transcendental subject.  
Thus, in explicit counterpoint to logicist epistemologies of mathematics like Kant’s 
or Husserl’s, Cavaillès, for instance, takes a “constructivist line” (17), and insists that the 
only unity mathematics can aspire to is given by its own history, and not by some external, 
‘more’ fundamental, or higher order principle, which can only “provide normativity at the 
expense of novelty” (19). Crucially, however, this history is not to be “assimilated to cultur-
al history or a phenomenological conception of the lifeworld. It is a history of the transfor-
mations undergone by concepts and objects as they acquire their form at a particular mo-
ment, in a particular problematic” (ibid.). For lack of a better word, one could call it ‘concep-
tual,’ if it were not for the fact that concepts are no more privileged in this history than the 
problems they respond to, or the objects and subjectivities they help construct, or the rules 
                                                 
4 Michel Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge, translated by A.M. Sheridan Smith (London: Routledge, 
2002), 17. 
5 Michel Foucault, The Order of Things (London: Routledge, 2002), 347. 
6 As the concept of ‘structure’ reopened the “relation of the human sciences to mathematics” (Foucault, 
The Order of Things, 416) in contemporary culture, Foucault notes, the concern for “a general formalization 
of thought and knowledge” (Ibid., 417) and the questions associated with it “suddenly open up the possi-
bility, and the task, […] of applying a second critique of pure reason on the basis of new forms of the 
mathematical a priori” (Ibid., 417-18). Avoiding polemics, Webb is content to find a precedent for Fou-
cault’s ‘quasi-structuralism’ in the Anthropology in Serres, who also appreciated the opportunities offered 
up by a certain kind of formal analysis, but was “already aware of the limits of orthodox structuralism” 
(Webb, Foucault's Archaeology, 23; see also 148). The strongest formulation occurs on page 120 (ibid.): “In 
steering a path between structuralism and hermeneutics, [Foucault] is implicitly following the pro-
gramme for historical analysis that Serres proposed in 1961.”  
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that form them all. Importantly, Webb argues that it is this “mathematical background to 
archaeology [that] allows Foucault to introduce the idea of historical a priori conditions for 
discourse without repeating the distinction between the transcendental and empirical that 
would tie archaeology back into the situation from which it aims to break free” (2), namely 
the big ‘anthropological sleep’ that had led modern thought into impasse, according to Fou-
cault’s diagnosis in the Order of Things (46).  
The second major achievement of the Archaeology on Webb’s account is that it offers, 
in support of its revised concept of history (non-memorial, ‘monumental,’ tabular, etc.), a 
model of temporal dispersion that Foucault’s later, so-called genealogical, writings will fur-
ther refine to fit their shift in emphasis from discursive to non-discursive practices, but not 
challenge7 (e.g. 135). Here, again, Webb finds precedents in Bachelard’s temporal atomism, 
and Serres’ Hermes books and reading of Lucretius, but even more to his credit he valorizes 
Foucault’s reflections on the role of time in “the dispersion of syntheses”8 in Kant’s Anthro-
pology, rather than their unification, as in the first Critique: “Time [in Kant’s Anthropology] is 
not that in which, through which, and by which synthesis is achieved; it wears away the syn-
thetic activity itself.”9 Webb then convincingly connects these reflections to the associated 
motif – in the Order of Things and the Archaeology – of the overcoming of what Foucault re-
fers to as the ‘analytic of finitude,’ which only rehearses and further entrenches the anthro-
pological doubling characteristic of modernity (esp. 34-38). This model of temporal disper-
sion is an achievement of Foucault’s archaeology, according to Webb, precisely because it 
offers an alternative (137) to Heidegger’s hermeneutics of Dasein in Being and Time, and his 
famous ‘interpretation’ of Kantian anthropology in Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, both 
of which persevere in the transcendental direction of temporal unification through an even 
‘more’ fundamental form of ontological analysis.10 
The third major achievement of the Anthropology, on Webb’s account, is that it sets 
an experimental (‘constructivist’) tone in the writing of intellectual history that is both ar-
gued for and brilliantly executed, and that Foucault’s late writings on the ‘aesthetics of the 
                                                 
7 Webb forgoes any detailed discussion of other Foucauldian texts (‘archaeological’ or ‘genealogical’). 
When he refers to them, or sketches lines of development among them, it is only for the sake of clarifying 
the stakes of the Archaeology. Yet, Webb’s commentary reads all the better for this self-limitation: in a col-
laborative spirit, he invites his readers to further test his hypothesis against other works by Foucault, or 
read around the topic to make up for the briefness of his discussions of Bachelard, Cavaillès, and Serres, 
or for the omission of other thinkers (Canguilhem and Althusser) who have been discussed more exten-
sively in the literature (Webb, Foucault's Archaeology, 2). 
8 Foucault, Introduction to Kant’s Anthropology, 89, cited in Webb, Foucault's Archaeology, 37. 
9 Foucault, Introduction to Kant’s Anthropology, 90. As Webb astutely remarks, “Paradoxically, it is in 
Kant’s Anthropology that Foucault finds the first traces of a process that will lead to the disappearance of 
man” (37). 
10 See also Webb, Foucault's Archaeology, 99-103, for the quickly drawn but suggestive contrast between 
the two thinkers on the issue of language: “while Foucault can describe discourse, as did Heidegger, as 
the ontological condition of language, this is because it is the site not of the disclosure of Being, but of the 
construction of what is” (99). 
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self’ will thematize and expand on (165f). Indeed, in raising the issue of the ‘value’ of ar-
chaeology (what it is good for? why should we prefer it to other types of analysis?), Webb 
notes that, “[i]f there is a prevailing value here, it is that of experimentation, and the possi-
bility of transforming the conditions of existence” (128). This remark ties in with the most 
heuristically successful part of Webb’s commentary, to my mind, namely his argument that 
we understand Foucault’s emphasis on ‘rules’ as ‘regularities’ in the Archaeology in the spirit 
of the much sought after historical a prioris (always multiplying out of reason’s control), i.e. 
as conditions that do not stand ‘apart or above the experience they condition.’  
Webb explicitly draws here on Serres’s notion of regularity in The Birth of Physics, in 
order to describe a “recursive mechanism by virtue of which what is conditioned bears on 
the conditions that preceded it” (103), which is structurally isomorphic with the “feedback 
loop from discursive events to their conditions” (155) that gives the concept of ‘rule’ (or 
‘law’) in Anthropology its bite. Precisely because it emerges from the discontinuous elements 
of a series to which it can then be said to apply, a regularity is not a formal condition (i.e. a 
condition of possibility) but rather a ‘condition of existence,’ as Foucault never tires to insist 
(see 58, 62f, 66f, 82f, 110, 155, etc.). Contra classical metaphysics, Kantian philosophy, and 
phenomenology (103f), which maintain the separation between condition and conditioned 
(as well as transcendental and empirical, structure and development, metalanguage and 
language, normative and descriptive, continuity and discontinuity, etc.), the concept of 
‘regularity’ serves to blur such traditional distinctions by “requir[ing] a close alternation” 
(46) between their poles. Thus, a focus on regularities undoes the (hierarchical) privileges of 
“priority and irreversibility” (117) that accrue traditionally to the marked side of the philo-
sophical division. Yet, the archaeological description of regularities does not simply reverse 
this hierarchy (it is not a form of dialectical analysis, or ideology critique) but rather “sets 
out a view of plural transformations in which continuity and discontinuity [as well as con-
dition and conditioned, structure and development, etc.] both feature” (138) – to the point 
of allowing these distinctions not only to blur, but also eventually to “fade away altogether” 
(136). 
It is in this letting-fade-away of traditional dichotomies that Webb locates the exper-
imental and transformative potential of Foucault’s archaeology. As he points out with re-
spect to the impossibility of morality in modernity diagnosed in The Order of Things, “Ar-
chaeology does not promise a direct response to this problem, but it does describe a change 
to the framework in which the problem arises” (164). To wit, archaeological description 
cannot be a direct, frontal, rational-instrumental intervention (155), since it cannot deter-
mine its own ‘archive’ (meaning that it cannot ground itself as if from on-high-and-outside 
the very historical process it describes). Unlike a classical epistemological discourse that 
looks for the criteria that legitimate a certain form of knowledge as ‘true’ necessarily, ar-
chaeology “has a certain [infinite, see 142] openness and revisability built into it” (46) in vir-
tue of the “two-way communication between conditions and conditioned” (104). And this 
revisability applies to the effect of its descriptions on the regularities it targets. Archeology 
is thus a kind of ‘re-writing’ (or ‘recursive analysis,’ in Foucault’s words), which involves a 
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certain repetition that – in the manner of the internal epistemology of mathematics dis-
cussed by Serres – not only rehearses the movement through which regularities get formed, 
but also “adds to the pattern of regularities” (24) and transforms this pattern ever so slight-
ly. On Webb’s sympathetic reading then, Foucault’s archaeological redescription of moder-
nity may just be a step beyond it. 
 This brief presentation hopefully explains why, though play-by-play, Webb’s 
book is not simply a running commentary on the Archaeology. (Even if it were, it should still 
be of great service to the community of Foucault’s readers, since the Archaeology is by far the 
least ‘popular’ and most stultifying of his texts, with its cascading terminological innova-
tions, its sprawling, obdurate flatness, and its unrelieved abstraction.) There is a fair 
amount of rational, philosophical reconstruction that goes into Webb’s account. Indeed, if 
we imagine for a moment Foucault’s massive conceptual patchwork in the Archaeology as a 
catoptric anamorphosis, in which the relentless multiplication and marshalling of distinc-
tions, concepts, and layers of analysis produce blurring or distorting effects, then Webb’s 
rational-reconstructive work in this commentary functions like a conical or cylindrical mir-
ror placed orthogonally on it, which makes the otherwise flat and distorted image visible in 
depth, or vertically, and from more than one angle.  
However, it is this very rational-reconstructive push of Webb’s commentary that in 
the end has to be squared with the ‘constructivist’ pull of Foucault’s text, insofar as it raises 
the issue of this commentary’s very status: is Webb’s proposal that we consider Foucault’s 
archaeology in light of its mathematical ‘precedents’ just another interpretation? Or is it the 
‘right’ interpretation? More importantly, is it an interpretation at all? My optical metaphor 
seems loaded, in that it appears to imply answering ‘yes’ to the last two questions: anamor-
phic processes have historically been used as a means of disguising and disseminating ‘con-
fidential’ contents to an advised public. However, it is not my intention to suggest that the 
Archaeology deals in clandestine wares, despite Foucault’s conspiratorial innuendos. My 
suggestion is rather that Webb’s commentary strikes an uneasy yet ultimately productive 
compromise between an ‘interpretive’ and a ‘constructive’ attitude, just like a cylindrical 
mirror placed vertically on an anamorphic image not only corrects its distortion but also 
makes it visible from a plurality of angles.11 In this sense, Webb’s homage to Foucault con-
sists in treating archaeology the way the latter treated discursive events and regularities, 
namely as a ‘live’ method operating at a sub-visible – yet describable – level that is not hid-
den or secret, and that therefore requires not a hermeneutic deciphering, but rather a ‘tech-
nical’ (formal) one.  
While not purporting to be “the final word” (2), Webb’s commentary aims to pro-
vide just such a technical redescription of the Archaeology that would make it available for 
further interpretation from any number of other perspectives. The historical-legal category 
that Webb leans on most in his reconstruction, namely ‘precedent,’ is a case in point. (Occa-
sionally, Webb talks of ‘predecessors,’ but he is generally careful not to employ the vocabu-
                                                 
11 In contrast, oblique or perspectival anamorphosis, famously used by Hans Holbein the Younger in The 
Ambassadors, requires one to occupy a particular vantage in order to correct the distortion of the image. 
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lary of the history of ideas.) As we know, in common law, a precedent is a decision made in 
a particular case that becomes binding, or paradigmatic – a ‘rule’ – for a whole series of 
subsequent cases that involve similar issues or facts. The question, however, arises whether 
the legal metaphor (despite superficial commonalities with the regularities of Serres and 
Foucault) does not return Webb to a continuous space of reason(s) and similarity: for argu-
ing from precedent is a form of justification, or legitimation, and hence normative rather 
than descriptive. More specifically, the ambiguity that creeps into Webb’s account as an ar-
gument from precedent concerns the principle of continuity (‘stare decisis’ in legal jargon, 
which mandates that judges abide by previous decisions), and the extent to which it pre-
disposes Webb to emphasize, in Foucault’s intellectual trajectory, continuous macro-change 
over discontinuous micro-transformations (and so adopt an interpretive stance). This issue 
(the uneasy side of the compromise I was alluding to above) remains suspended in Webb’s 
commentary, where most time is spent arguing for the similarities or analogies between 
Foucault’s approach and the epistemological and historical reflections of Cavaillès, 
Bachelard, and Serres, and only a fraction is devoted to tracking the specific transfor-
mations that occur as Foucault is “translating them from mathematics to the human scienc-
es” (61). Yet, I agree with Webb’s principled stance that a narrative pressing too much on 
discontinuity – here the “radical shift from archaeology to genealogy” (136) – merely re-
verses the undue privileges accorded continuity by the history of ideas (138f), and is no 
more informative about the plurality of minute transformations that take place in and 
among Foucault’s works than the master category of change criticized by Foucault. 
In sum, thanks to its specialized focus, modest size, and brevity of style, David 
Webb’s book has a lot to offer to anyone interested in Foucault, whether this interest is 
philosophical, historical, or simply intellectual. Foucault experts will find much to work 
with – along or against the grain of Webb’s reconstruction.12 Furthermore, if carefully and 
patiently unpacked,13 this book can be a great resource for any course introducing students 
(even at the undergraduate level) to Foucault’s Archaeology, his “Discourse (on) Method.” 
 
Adina Arvatu 
                                                 
12 It can, for instance, help clarify the stakes of a debate hosted by this very journal a few years back on the 
issue of Foucault’s transcendentalism. See Colin Koopman, “Historical Critique or Transcendental Cri-
tique in Foucault: Two Kantian Lineages”, Foucault Studies, 8 (February 2010), 100-121; Kevin Thompson, 
“Response to Colin Koopman’s ‘Historical Critique or Transcendental Critique in Foucault: Two Kantian 
Lineages”, ibid., 122-128; and Colin Koopman, “Historical Conditions or Transcendental Conditions: Re-
sponse to Kevin Thompson’s Response”, ibid., 129-135. 
13 And, one should hope, also corrected at the level of copy, by the time the paperback rolls out. Though 
not so many as to riddle the text, the typos are still distracting – even misleading on one occasion, i.e. the 
misspelling of a phenomenological terminus technicus in French (le vécu) in endnote 2 on page 166. The 
issue would be minor, if the same note were not promising to correct an oversight in the English transla-
tion of The Order of Things, which renders le vécu as ‘actual experience’ instead of ‘lived experience,’ as 
Husserl’s Erlebnis is generally translated. This correction is in fact forgotten quite quickly, and Webb soon 
returns to ‘actual experience’ in the body of the text. 
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